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• A model to predict crater dimensions given a LOC in underground pipelines is proposed 
• The model implements 57 real accidents of natural gas underground pipelines 
• The approach proposes worst, mean and less severe scenarios to support decision-making 
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Abstract
Parallel and crossing pipelines are frequently implemented due to land-use restrictions and their
ease of operation and maintenance. Given the proximity of these pipelines and the hazardousness
of the substances they transport, an eventual Loss of Containment (LOC) in a parallel/crossing
corridor can lead to a domino eff ct that should be considered in Quantitative Risk Analysis
(QRA). For underground pipelines, this LOC is accompanied by a formation of a crater, which
can uncover adjacent pipelines triggering a domino effect scenario to take place. This paper
aims to develop a model to predict feasible crater dimensions (i.e., width and depth) from a
LOC in underground natural gas pipelines using operational and structural parameters. For this
purpose, a recent review of 57 underground natural gas pipeline accidents were considered in a
probability-based approach once data was processed. This approach initially predicts the Width-
to-Depth crater ratio (WD) using a multivariate regression. Then feasible crater dimensions were
determined using the regression prediction interval and the width-depth joint probability func-
tion, which is approximated with a Gaussian copula. This approach proposes a worst, mean and
less severe scenarios to support decision-making processes regarding parallel or crossing under-
ground natural gas pipelines with a LOC. Besides the identification of domino effect scenarios,
this information can be used to support pipeline segmentation for risk analysis or even to support
Right-of-Way (ROW) definition during pipeline installation.
Keywords: Crater formation, Crater model, Underground pipeline, Domino effect, Natural gas.
1. Introduction
Pipelines are the safest and most cost-effective means of transporting hydrocarbons such as
natural gas over long distances. These pipelines are frequently installed in a parallel or crossing
distribution, and they include other services such as water distribution or electric wiring (Casal
et al., 1995; Majid & Mohsin, 2013). This is due to land-use restrictions and the fact that pipelines
distributed this way make operation and maintenance easier (Shi et al., 2012). However, these
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systems undergo different degradation processes related to their operation and surrounding con-
ditions that can lead to a possible Loss of Containment (LOC), which in turn, can severely affect
the population or environment around the pipelines. Because of the proximity of the parallel
and crossing pipelines, a LOC can trigger a domino effect of accidents in the adjacent pipelines,
thus aggravating the eff cts of the initial event (Ramı́rez-Camacho et al., 2015). Therefore, the
domino effect should be included in the Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) of pipelines to reduce
uncertainty in the risk calculation.
For underground pipelines, a crater is formed because of LOC, which can expose adjacent
pipelines to a possible domino eff ct event. In the case of natural gas pipelines, this crater
can be caused by the sudden and catastrophic rupture of a high-pressure pipeline (e.g., due to
a mechanical failure), or by the explosive ignition of the gas accumulated from a leak in the
pipeline; for instance, due to weld cracks, corrosion defect or an accidental perforation. Once
the crater is formed by the rupture of the initial pipe, or source pipe (SP), the likelihood of a
domino effect event depends on whether or not a second pipe, or -target pipe (TP), is within
the crater’s boundaries. If the TP was not exposed in the initial rupture, then the TP would not
suffer any damages because of the protecting soil that surrounds it. If the TP lies within the crater
dimensions (totally or partially), it can fail because of two main scenarios. The first one is related
to the overpressure from the SP explosion; this could affect the TP totally or partially, leading
to its failure. The other scenario is associated with a thermal failure when the initial rupture
did not affect the TP. This thermal failure occurs due to the impingement of a fire that would
spring from the gas leaking from the SP. Based on the aforementioned scenarios, given a LOC,
the probability of a pipeline being exposed should be associated with the crater dimensions and
the spatial distribution of the parallel/crossing pipeline corridor.
To prevent such domino eff ct scenarios, safety distances between parallel and crossing
pipelines and their surroundings have been proposed in standard or code practices such as that
reported for natural gas and water parallel pipelines by the Energy Commission of Malaysia
(clearance of> 300 mm) or the ASMEB31.8 (clearance of> 6 in for an underground structure)
(Mohsin et al., 2014; Shi et al., 2012). Other approaches like Silva et al. (2016) suggest a10
m separation for underground pipelines based on an analysis of historical accidents, and PE-
MEX (2009) recommend a minimum separation of 1 m in the same ditch. Nevertheless, as was
pointed out in Alileche et al. (2015), safety distances in domino effect scenarios depend on the
escalating effects from the primary system, so these safety distances should actually consider the
minimum separation at which escalating events are avoided. In the case of natural gas, the possi-
ble final events are Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE), Flash Fire, and Jet Fire (Ramı́rez-Camacho
et al., 2017), so the safety distance would be delimited by: the extension of the flame envelope
(Flash Fire); the flame length and its direction (Jet Fire); or the overpressure associated with the
explosion energy (VCE) (Alileche et al., 2015). Consequently, further analysis is required to es-
timate a safety distance as the approaches reported in Haklar (1997), Haklar & Dresnack (1999),
Sklavounos & Rigas (2006), Mohsin et al. (2014) show for Jet Fire scenarios, which are the most
probable events (Bubbico et al., 2016).
Based on the aforementioned, to estimate safety distances in parallel or crossing underground
pipelines, whether or not the crater formed by a LOC can expose the other pipe should be de-
termined. Once this information is known, approaches like Haklar (1997); Haklar & Dresnack
(1999) can be implemented to support decision-making in domino effect scenarios. Currently,
the work aiming to predict the crater dimensions from a pipeline LOC is limited. Therefore, the
central problem here is to create a model that adequately predicts the crater dimensions. There














et al., 2002; Acton et al., 2010; NSI, 2012) that were developed based on experimental results
which depend on soil properties from the pipeline location. There are other approaches that
use TNT explosion models based on a set of experiments or FEM (Finite Elements Modeling)
(Ambrosini et al., 2002; Ambrosini & Luccioni, 2006; Krishna et al., 2016). Finally, there is
an approach called the Accident-based model recently proposed by Silva et al. (2016) which
implements a polynomial regression on 17 underground accidents.
The aforementioned models have some limitations that may prevent their use or aff ct the
final predictions. The Gasunie, Battelle, Advantica, NEN 3651, and the Accident-based models
all focus on crater width predictions, but only the Gasunie and Batelle models incorporate crater
depth calculations. This prevents the Advantica, NEN3651, and Accident-based approaches
from being eligible for use in crossing pipelines. These five models are deterministic and they
require a soil classification, which affects their predictions. Hence, they have important sources
of uncertainty. Regarding the TNT models, these approaches may significantly differ from the
real crater dimensions because of the ”hydraulic mining hose” described by Peekema (2013).
According to Peekema (2013), the final crater dimensions will be greater because of the fluid
pushed out from the broken pipeline lightly scours the soil. Therefore, TNT models would
underestimate the real crater dimensions, representing a threat for crossing or parallel corridors.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no other model that deals with crater formation caused by
ruptures or leakages of underground pipelines appears to be publicly available.
Bearing in mind these limitations, the objective of this paper is to propose a probability-based
approach to model the most likely crater dimensions using information about design, operation,
and installation of a pipeline, which is known. For this purpose, a historical review of 90 natural
gas accidents was considered (Ramı́rez-Camacho et al., 2017) focusing on parameters such as the
pipeline wall thickness, diameter, burial depth, and operating pressure. After data processing, 57
of these 90 records are implemented in a multivariate regression to predict the Width-to-Depth
crater ratio (WD) and determine its prediction interval. Using the WD prediction interval and
the joint width-depth probability density function, which is obtained from a Gaussian copula,
a maximum and mean criterion were proposed to determine the less severe, mean and worst
scenarios for the crater dimensions.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the available pipeline crater models.
Section 3 presents the probability-based approach. Section 4 discusses the main results related
to the crater predicted dimensions, and Section 5 presents some concluding remarks.
2. Review of pipeline crater approaches
This section describes the five available models which seek to predict the crater dimensions
due to a failure of a buried pipeline: i) Gasunie, ii) Batelle, iii) NEN 3651, iv) Advantica and v)
Accident-based model. The assumptions and limitations of each model are described below; a
summary of each model is presented in Table 1. This table illustrates the type of information that
each model implements. Among the information reported, there are structural parameters (e.g.,
pipeline diameter), operation parameters, soil parameters, installation parameters (e.g., burial
depth), properties of the transporting fluid (e.g., density), and the output from each model.
2.1. Gasunie model
The Gasunie model has three main assumptions. They are that: i) the ends of pipes are














Table 1: Summary of models to predict crater dimensions
Model Approach Struct. Op. Soil Installation Gas Output Ref.
Gasunie Experimental ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ W&D (Leis et al., 2002)
Batelle Experimental ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ W&D (Leis et al., 2002)
Advantica Experimental ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ W (Acton et al., 2010)
NEN3651 Experimental ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ W (NSI, 2012)
Accident-based Historical analysis ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ W (Silva et al., 2016)
Proposed model Probabilistic ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ W&D -
W: Width, W&D: Width and Depth, Struct.:Structural parameters, Op.: Operating parameters
the pipeline and then the axial length is increased due to soil erosion by the fluid; and iii) the
soil has homogeneous properties (Silva et al., 2016). This model was proposed by the Delft
Hydraulics Laboratory and N. V. Nederlandse Gasunie Company, considering an elliptical cross-
sectional as the one illustrated in Fig. 1. In this case,D is the crater depth,α1 is the crater angle
at the ground surface,α2 is the crater angle atD/2, a andb are the ellipse shape parameters, and










Figure 1: Gasunie model Scheme.
If the rupture occurs at the top of the pipeline, this model assumes that the depth of the
crater is independent of the soil type. The crater depth is then determined based on the pipeline
diameterDp and the cover depthDc asD = Dp + Dc, where the cover depth corresponds with
the distance from the ground level to the top of the pipeline.
In case of a guillotine rupture, the soil type and moisture aff ct the depth of the crater (Leis
et al., 2002); therefore, a soil parameterν –reported for different soils in Leis et al. (2002) and
Luo et al. (2009)– and a functionR(ν) are implemented as follows:
R(ν) = 0.28+ 0.62(5− ν) − 0.07(25− ν2) (1)



















4.3Dp + Dc, if ν ≤ 0.6
R(ν)Dp
0.3
+ Dc, if 0.6 < ν < 2















The crater angles can be determined by the soil parameterν as follows:


































As pointed out by Luo et al. (2009), the Gasunie model is based on empirical correlations
that omit the pipeline operating pressure. So, this model could under or overestimate the crater
dimensions depending on high or low-pressure pipelines.
2.2. Batelle model
The Batelle model is an improvement of the Gasunie model in which the width of the crater is
determined as in a chemical explosion (Silva et al., 2016). This model assumes that a guillotine
rupture caused the crater and that it has two cross-sections, one of them following that reported



















whereukr is the critical gas velocity andux is the velocity of the explosive gases. The velocity of
the explosive gases is obtained from the gas (ρ) and soil (ρsoil) densities, the speed of sound (c)






The critical gas velocityukr is commonly taken as 2.54 m/s (Leis et al., 2002); however, Silva
et al. (2016) have observed that an underestimation of the crater width can be prevented if a mean
critical velocity of 1.8542 m/s is used instead. This model enhances the dimensions obtained
from the Gasunie model by including the specific heat ratio, the critical velocity at which the soil
can be removed, and the gas and soil densities. Nevertheless, this model uses the same qualitative















Table 2: Crater width regressions for the Advantica Model repo ted by Silva et al. (2016)
Soil type Pressure (bars) Diameter (in) Regression
Sandy soil
20 * W = 0.3999Dp + 5.469
40 ≤ 12.8 W = −10−14Dp + 10.875
> 12.8 W = 0.3934Dp + 5.7275
60 ≤ 24.0 W = 0.0278Dp + 14.6060
> 24.0 W = 0.3927Dp + 5.80
80-150 * W = 0.39999Dp + 5.4695
Clay soil
20 ≤ 36.1 W = 0.0237Dp + 6.0135
> 36.1 W = 0.093Dp + 3.4989
40 ≤ 36.0 W = 0.0258Dp + 5.9839
> 36.0 W = 0.1445Dp + 1.6881
60 ≤ 24.0 W = 0.0237Dp + 5.9989
> 24.0 W = 0.2437Dp + 0.5545
80 * W = 0.3148Dp + 0.1522
100 * W = 0.3710Dp + 0.0842
150 ≤ 12.6 W = −0.0075Dp + 5.5811
> 12.6 W = 0.3562Dp + 1
Mixed soil
≤ 80 ≤ 36.1 W = 0.0244Dp + 10.276
> 36.1 W = 0.1946Dp + 4.0742
*Any diameter
2.3. Advantica model
This model is based on experimental results obtained from Acton et al. (2010) in which
twelve natural gas releases were reported with pressures ranging from 20 to 150 bars and diam-
eter between 25 to 80 mm in adjacent buried pipelines. Considering this information, Silva et al.
(2016) determined linear regressions regarding the crater width shown in Table 2.
2.4. NEN 3651& Accident-based model
The NEN 3651 was developed by the Nederlands Normalisatie Instituut to provide require-
ments for elements reported in NEN 3650. The available information about this standard is
limited and only the radius of the corresponding crater for a guillotine rupture is reported, which




0.64(D3pP)2/3 + 0.65(D3pP)1/3) − 0.83D2c (8)
Finally, the Accident-based model proposed by Silva et al. (2016) uses 17 reported accidents
to obtain a multivariate polynomial regression of the width of the crater. This regression consid-
ers parameters reported in the previous models such as the specific heat ratio, the density of the
soil, and the operating pressure:
W = 40.795+ 0.382Dp − 0.068P+ 4.844Dc − 10.069γ − 0.020ρsoil (9)
3. Probabilistic-based approach based on natural gas accidents
The methodology is divided in three phases (Fig. 2). Initially, the records obtained in
Ramı́rez-Camacho et al. (2017) are processed. These records are then used to predict the WD
ratio. Finally, the feasible crater dimensions are determined using the width-depth joint proba-
bility and a maximum or mean value approach depending on the pipeline diameter. Each of these
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Figure 2: Overall methodology
3.1. Data processing
Some of the records gathered did not include information about all features; for instance, 29
records did not report the width or the depth of the crater, and another 9 were included based on
their crater-approximated dimensions. In fact, only 28 of the 90 records included information
regarding the pipeline diameter, wall thickness, operating pressure, burial depth, and the crater
dimensions (width and depth). Therefore, three different strategies (Barlow’s formula, a refer-
ence cover and a WD ratio) were considered to complete thea priori unavailable information.
Barlow’s formula was implemented to obtain an approximation of the pipeline’s internal
pressure or the wall thickness. This formula associates the pipeline’s internal pressureP, the
allowable stress, which is assumed to be 72% of the yield strengthσY (Zhao et al., 2012), the
wall thicknessWT, and the outside diameterDp as follows (Stewart, 2016, p.834):
P =
2 · (72%σY) ·WT
Dp
(10)
From 11 records that did not include the operating pressure or the wall thickness, only 3 of
them could be included with Barlow’s formula. This is because 8 of 11 records did not provide














could not gather more records because 24 other records omitted the pipeline operating pressure
and the wall thickness. So, this formula could not be implemented to approximate the missing
information.
A reference cover depth was implemented to avoid the use of the burial depth, which is a
feature that 40 records did not report. In this paper, a minimum cover depth of 3 ft. (0.9144
m) was implemented, which is commonly reported for transmission pipelines (ASME, 2002,
2004) despite that the cover depths depend on several variables such as the soil properties and
pipeline route. Therefore, the cover depths were translated to this reference considering that
the difference between the burial and the cover depths is the pipeline diameter (Fig. 3). With
the burial depth of the pipeline defined asbd and the pipeline diameter asDp, the cover depth is
calculated asDc = bd−Dp. Considering the difference between this cover depth and the reference
Drc = 0.9144− Dc, the adjusted depth with this reference cover is given byD∗ = D + Drc. It was
assumed that those records that did not report their cover depth have a reference cover of 0.9144
m. This is not a strong assumption considering that the cover depth can be as many as two
times the pipeline diameter (Mokhtari & Alavi, 2015). The records reported herein have a mean
relation of 1.8Dp and more than 70% reported a cover depth less or equal to 2Dp. Nonetheless,
a parallel evaluation was implemented without using this transformation to determine if this



























Figure 3: Cover and burial depth scheme
Finally, a WD crater ratio was used to complete the missing information in the 29 records
that did not report the crater’s width or depth, bearing in mind the assumption that the crater
was symmetrical. For this purpose, the models reported in Section 2 could be implemented;
nonetheless, there are several unknown parameters such as the soil parameters (Leis et al., 2002)
that prevent these models from being taken into account. The available information about the
WD ratio is scarce and only historical records of pipeline ruptures are reported. For instance,
McGillivray & Wilday (2009) reviewed the dimensions of the craters caused by historical gas
pipeline ruptures in the UK and found that the crater width varies from 1.7 to 33 m, whereas
the crater depth ranged from 1.7 to 7.6 m. They reported a total of 22 records where their WD
ratios have a mean value of 3.5 and a median near to 3.33. These results suggest that the width
and depth of the crater have a ratio near to 3:1 (i.e.,W/D = 3), so we assumed this WD ratio to
complete these 29 records. As in the cover depth assumption, a parallel assessment was carried














sake of simplicity, these sets will be referred to from here onas in Table 3.
Table 3: Dataset Classification
Dataset Reference Cover Depth WD Relation
Set 1 No No
Set 2 Yes No
Set 3 No Yes
Set 4 Yes Yes
3.2. Prediction of WD ratio
3.2.1. Multivariate regression approach
Based on the records obtained from the data processing, a multivariate parametric regression
is proposed to model the WD ratio. Additionally, a logarithmic regression was used in this
approach because some features, such as the WD, had wider ranges (i.e., greater than 10:1).
These features follow nonlinear performances, and the logarithmic scale helped stabilize the
variance (Maindonald & Braun, 2010). Recall, that ifY denotes the response andXi the variables
evaluated, the logarithmic regression would have the general form of Eq. 11, which is equivalent
to a general power relation. Hereβ0 is the intercept,βi are the regression coefficients obtained
from a least squares approach andǫ is the associated error.
logY = β0 +
∑
i
βi logXi + ǫ (11)
Variables are selected to determine which predictors (i.e., features) better described the WD
final response. For this purpose, a mixed approach that combines forward and backward selection
was considered. This selection starts with no variables and then variables are added one by one
to provide a better fit. If the p-value of one of the variables rises above a given threshold, then
the variable is removed. This procedure is repeated until all variables in the model have an
adequate p-value and the external variables, if included in the model, would affect the regression
capabilities (James et al., 2013).
The model fit was initially determined based on two well-known numerical measures: the
Residual Standard Error (RSE) and the adjustedR2 statistic. The first one is an estimate of the
standard deviation of the error based on the Residual Sum of Squares (RSS), and the latter is a
measure of the linear relationship between the variables and the response. Besides these numer-
ical measures, the Akaike and Bayesian Information Criteria (AIC and BIC) were implemented.
These selection criteria are numerical values that are by themselves meaningless, but are used
to compare competing models or regressions and they are commonly used instead of other tests
(see for instance Posada & Buckley (2004)). AIC ranks the information loss and the unaccount-
able information, whereas BIC is based on a log likelihood function incorporating the deviance
of the model fit and penalizing for additional parameters (Stancescu, 2014). Both criteria prefer
those models with the lowest results. Additional information about these selection criteria can
be found elsewhere (see for instance Konishi & Kitagawa (2008)).
Setk = p+ 1 wherep denotes the number of fitted parameters and letn be the sample size
for the regression. For small samples (i.e.,n/k < 40) the modified version of AIC, which is
calculated based onp by the RSS, is recommended (Symonds & Moussalli, 2011). The modified

































+ k logn+ n+ n log(2π)
(12)
To evaluate the robustness of the regressions, their linearity, independence, homoscedastic-
ity, and normality assumptions (Yan & Su, 2009) were evaluated using the regression diagnostic
plots (i.e. residual and quantile-quantile (QQ) plots). The linearity assumption indicates that
the response and the predictors have a linear, additive relationship; the independence assump-
tion establishes statistical independence of the regression errors; the homoscedasticity assures a
constant variance of the errors; and the normality assumption means that these errors are nor-
mally distributed. Additionally, an outlier and leverage diagnosis was implemented to evaluate
if any register should be removed. The first identifies records that may differ from the bulk of
the data evaluated, whereas a leverage observation has an unusual value in the independent vari-
ables (i.e., predictor). To identify possible outliers, the studentized residuals plot was considered,
which corresponds with the residual errors divided by their standard error. According to James
et al. (2013), the observations whose studentized residuals are greater than 3 (absolutely) are
possible outliers. Regarding the leverage diagnosis, the leverage statistichi (between 1/n and 1)
was calculated to identify observations with higher leverage. For this purpose, the leverage plot
included in the diagnostic plots was considered.
3.2.2. WD Prediction interval
Based on the regression coefficients, the confidence interval for the coefficients and the pre-
diction interval were determined. According to Rencher & Schaalje (2008), the 100(1− α)%
confidence interval of thejth regression coefficientβ j is given as follows:
β̃ j ± tα/2,n−k−1RS E
√
g j j (13)
wheretα/2,n−k−1 is the Student’st inverse cumulative distribution atα/2 with n − k − 1 degrees
of freedom,
√





(n− k− 1) , whereyi
is theith reported WD and ˆyi is theith predicted WD. HereX is an× k matrix that corresponds
with the fitted observations for each of the k predictors.
Consider the future response ˜yo, which is obtained from the regression coefficients evaluated
at a (k+ 1) column vectorXo with predictors 1, x0, x1, . . . , xk. So, the prediction interval is given
by (Rencher & Schaalje, 2008):
ỹo ± tα/2,n−k−1RS E
√
1+ X′o(X′X)−1Xo (14)
In this paper, the prediction intervals were determined using thepredict function in the open
source R-project.
3.3. Feasible crater dimensions
3.3.1. Width and depth fitting probabilities
Initially, the width and depth probability density functions (pdf) were determined based on














by Goodness of Fit tests such as Chi-Square, Kolmogorov Smirnov or Anderson Darling. How-
ever, these approaches usually depend on predefined parameter values and not on estimated pa-
rameters from the available data (Stancescu, 2014). Therefore, an information criteria approach
was implemented instead, where the number of parameters of the fitted distribution is considered
to select the simple and consistent model. In this paper, a BIC was used following the Sheppard
(2012) function, and a copula was implemented to approximate the width-depth jointpdf based
on the width and depth marginalpdfs.
3.3.2. Copula-based approach
Overall, copulas are functions that couple multivariate distributions from their marginal dis-
tributions. These functions have uniform one-dimensional margins, and they are invariant un-
der any monotone, increasing transformations on the marginal distributions (Montes-Iturrizaga
& Heredia-Zavoni, 2015). These functions represent a parametric approach for modeling the
dependent structure in joint distributions of random variables (Escarela & Hernández, 2009)
as shown in several areas such as finance, stock market, or even mortality models (Frees &
Valdez, 1998). Consider the vectorX of m random variables with marginal distribution functions
Fi(xi), i = 1, . . . ,m. Let the set of transformationsUi = Fi(xi) define a dependent, uniformly
distributed vector ofm random variablesU on [0, 1]m. Based on Sklar’s theorem, if the marginal
distributionsFi(xi) are continuous, then theX joint probability distribution function can be de-
termined as follows (Montes-Iturrizaga & Heredia-Zavoni, 2015):
F(X) = C(F1(x1), . . . , Fm(xm)) = C(U1, . . . ,Um) (15)
whereC(U) = C(U1,U2, . . . ,Um) is the copula distribution. Moreover, the jointpdf of X can be
determined using the marginalpdf of all the random variables (fi xi) for i = 1, . . . ,m) and the
copula density functionc(F1(x1), . . . , Fm(xm)) as:





A detailed introduction to the theory and copula types can be found in Nelsen (2007); Escarela
& Hernández (2009); Montes-Iturrizaga & Heredia-Zavoni (2015).
To determine the width-depth joint distribution, the Gaussian copula was used due to its
similarity to the bivariate Gaussian distribution. This copula follows this general form:
Cr (v1, v2) = Φ2[Φ−1(v1),Φ−1(v2)], (v1, v2)T ∈ (0, 1)2 (17)
whereΦ−1(·) is the inverse normal cumulative distribution andΦ2(·, ·) is the joint distribution
function of a bivariate Gaussian distribution with meanO and correlation matrixR. Because this
matrix is normalized, it is associated with the Pearson correlation coeffi ients matrix. Therefore,
it is used to incorporate the dependence between the width and depth random variables. For
this purpose, the measures most implemented at invariant scales are the population versions of
Kendall and Spearman. They correspond to a form of dependence known as concordance, which
allows a reliable estimation when the copula is assumed to belong a specific parametric family














3.3.3. Normalized pdf given the predicted WD ratio
Assume that the WD ratio is determined from the above multivariate regression and the width
is taken asW =WD · D. Then, the width-depth jointpdf from Eq. 16 is given by:
fW,D(WD · d, d) = c(FD(d), FW(WD · d)) fD(d) fW(WD · d) (18)
whereFD (FW) and fD ( fW) are the distribution andpdf of the crater depth (width). Note that
this jointpdf follows paths as in Fig. 4 because of the WD linear relationship.
Consider the prediction interval in Eq.14 and denote the lower, fit and upper WD asWDlwr ,
WDf it andWDf it , respectively. To determine the feasible dimensions, three preliminary scenar-
ios are proposed for a pipeline diameter less than 18 in:
• Upper scenario: This scenario uses the upper limit of the WD prediction interval in the
joint pdf to select the most probable crater depth:D∗ = max
d
{
fW,D(WDupr · d, d)
}
. The
width of the crater is then calculated using this WD ratio.
• Lower scenario: This scenario uses the lower limit of the WD prediction interval in the
joint pdf to select the most probable crater depth:D∗ = max
d
{
fW,D(WDlwr · d, d)
}
. The
width of the crater is then calculated using this WD ratio.
• Mean scenario: This scenario uses the fitted WD value in the jointpdf to select the most
probable crater depth:D∗ = max
d
{
fW,D(WDf it · d, d)
}
. The width of the crater is then




































Figure 4: Scheme of the three preliminary scenarios
Fig. 4 shows the linear relation of the upper, lower and fit WD ratio, and the width-depth
joint probability schematically. The three lines represent thepdf obtained from Eq.18 using
these three ratios. Note that a higher WD ratio may involve a lower feasible depth in comparison
with the fit and lower confidence limit because of the shape of the jointpdf.
In the case of a pipeline whose diameter is greater or equal to 18 inches, these scenarios
change slightly. Instead of using a maximum criterion to determine the feasible dimensions, we
consider the expected value of the normalizedpdf. Algorithm 1 describes the main procedure














this case, the input parameters are the WD ratio, a partition parameternp, the maximum width
Wmax and the pipeline diameterDp. Herenp andWmax are chosen from the final user.
Algorithm 1 Feasible crater dimensions
Input: WD ratio,np (partition),Wmax, Dp (pipeline diameter).
Output Feasible dimensions ofW andD∗
1: Setweval := [0.001 :Wmax] {Vector withnp equally spaced points from 0.001 toWmax}
2: Setdeval := weval/WD {Calculate the equivalent depth for each width inweval}
3: Initialize the vectorfW,D = [0, . . . ,0] {With np points}
4: for i = 1 to np do
5: fW,D = c(FD(deval(i)), FW(WD · deval(i))) fD(deval(i)) fW(WD · deval(i)). {See Eq. 18}
6: end for
7: if Dp < 18in then
8: indmax =Find(max(fW,D))
9: W = weval(indimax) {The width with the maximumfW,D}
10: D∗ = deval(indimax) {The adjusted depth with the maximumfW,D}
11: else
12: fW,D = fW,D/Area(fW,D , deval). {Obtained the normalizedpdf, dividing by the area ofW,D with deval}
13: D∗ = E[ fW,D ] {The adjusted depth is the mean offW,D with deval)}
14: W = D∗ ·WD {Calculate the width with the WD ratio}
15: end if
Finally, if the burial depthbd is reported, the corresponding crater depth is obtained using
D = D∗ + Dc − 0.9144, whereD∗ is the depth obtained from the maximum/expected value
criterion andDc is the cover depth calculated asDc = bd − Dp. Recall that if the cover depth
is not reported, it is assumed to be the reference cover of 0.9144, so the crater depth obtained
follows D = D∗.
As an alternative analysis of the preliminary scenarios mentioned before, the decision-maker
can select the WD within the prediction interval whose probability is the highest (using thepdf of
the WD ratio, just mentioned) or the following scenarios to approximate the crater dimensions:
• Less Severe scenario: This scenario implements the lowest width and depth dimensions
obtained from the Lower, Upper and Mean fits.
• The most likely scenario: This scenario implements the width and depth dimensions from
the Lower, Mean or Upper fits with the higher probability on the jointpdf (See Fig. 4).
• Worst scenario: This scenario implements the greatest width and depth dimensions ob-
tained from the Lower, Upper and Mean fits.
The aforementioned scenarios were considered with the initial Lower, Mean and Upper fits.
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. Data processing
4.1.1. Summary results of the proposed datasets
To evaluate if the data process affected the predictor variables significantly, the mean, coef-
ficient of variation (CoV) and the variable range were used for each dataset described in Table
3. To show their lack of information, Table 4 illustrates these results, including the total records























Width (m) Depth (m)
Set 1
(30 Records)
Total records 57 41 47 61 61
Mean 26.00 0.34 57.56 11.43 4.50
CoV 38.37% 36.35% 27.03% 56.62% 61.21%
Range [6-56] [0.071-0.752] [17.2-92.4] [1.5-33] [0.6-18.3]
Set 2
(41 Records)
Total records 57 41 47 61 61
Mean 26.00 0.34 57.56 11.43 4.33
CoV 38.37% 36.35% 27.03% 56.62% 51.08%
Range [6-56] [0.071-0.752] [17.2-92.4] [1.5-33] [0.6-10.88]
Set 3
(40 Records)
Total records 84 57 65 89 89
Mean 26.12 0.34 56.13 10.91 4.16
CoV 37.19% 32.40% 26.12% 58.63% 62.14%
Range [6-56] [0.071-0.752] [17.2-92.4] [1.5-33] [0.6-18.3]
Set 4
(57 Records)
Total records 84 57 65 89 89
Mean 26.12 0.34 56.13 10.91 4.09
CoV 37.19% 32.40% 26.12% 58.63% 53.48%
Range [6-56] [0.071-0.752] [17.2-92.4] [1.5-33] [0.6-10.88]
These four datasets are depicted in Fig. 5. From the initial 90accidents, 30 records were ob-
tained without considering the reference cover depth nor the data processing for the WD relation.
Once the reference cover (Set 2) or the WD relation (Set 3) was implemented from these records,
11 and 10 new records were processed respectively. Finally, when both approaches were im-
plemented, 6 new records (apart from Set 2 and 3 records) become available for the regression
analysis.









Figure 5: Datasets distribution scheme.
Overall, the differences among these datasets are not significant; the mean crater depth ob-
tained in Set 4 decreases 9% from the initial data of Set 1. Regarding the dispersion of the
datasets, the CoV of the diameter, wall thickness and the crater depth have a mean decrease of
3.44%, whereas the width CoV increases around 2.01%. Finally, the obtained ranges from each
dataset remain almost the same. These results suggest that the data processing did not provide
an important bias in this approach; on the contrary, it provided almost double that of the initial














4.1.2. Width and depth fitting pdfs
Based on the BIC approach, the Width and Depth distributions for each dataset were fitted
to Gamma distributions. Table 5 shows their fitting parameters. Note that the shape and scale
parameters do not change among each dataset significantly. In fact, even though the correlation
coefficient increases when the WD relation is implemented, this is not drastic given that near
30% of the initial WD dataset is included with this approximation.
Table 5: Width and Depth crater fitting BIC parameters.
Dataset Feature Distribution Shape parameter Scale parameter Correlation coefficient
Set 1
Width Gamma 3.0645 3.7308
0.4350
Depth Gamma 3.2347 1.3917
Set 2
Width Gamma 3.0645 3.7308
0.4387
Depth Gamma 3.8699 1.1178
Set 3
Width Gamma 2.8884 3.7765
0.5556
Depth Gamma 3.0618 1.3585
Set 4
Width Gamma 2.8884 3.7765
0.5788
Depth Gamma 3.4049 1.2006
The probability density function of the Width and Depth from each dataset is shown in Fig.
6, which illustrates that the distributions of the datasets do not present an important change
among them. Set 1 and Set 4 have almost the same shape with a difference near to 0.02 around
a depth of 2 m. Regarding to the width distributions, thepdf obtained from each dataset match
almost entirely. The aforementioned distributions and the results from Table 4 suggest that these
assumptions will not severely affect the final predictions of the regression. In contrast, the mul-
tivariate approach will obtain more reliable results due to the increase of the sample size. Based












































Figure 6: a) Width and b) Depth probability density function of each dataset.
4.2. Prediction of WD ratio
Initially, the mixed selection method was implemented in R-project to select the variables
that best describe the WD regression. The results of this selection model indicate that the WD














the mixed selection compares each regression model using itsp-value by adding variables one
by one to provide a better fit for the regression model. Table 6 shows the best multivariate
regressions using these variables after an outlier with aWD = 9 was removed. Note that these
regressions only illustrate the variables implemented. They include possible interactions among
their predictors, and they neglect the intercept parameter in all cases (i.e.,β0 n Eq. 11).
Table 6: Best multivariate regressions from Set 4.
Formula RSE R2-adj AICc BICc p-Value
log (WD) ∼ log (P) 0.4226 0.8474 65.4377 69.4884 2.48E-24
log (WD) ∼ log (P) + log(Dp) 0.4183 0.8505 65.2646 71.3407 1.94E-23
log (WD) ∼ log (P) + log(Dp) + log(WT) 0.4155 0.8525 65.4581 73.5595 1.19E-22
log (WD) ∼ log (P) + log (Dp)+log(P)log(Dp) 0.4123 0.8548 64.5987 72.7002 7.95E-23
log (WD) ∼ log (P) + log (WT)+log(Dp)+log(WT)log(Dp) 0.4191 0.8499 67.3638 77.4905 1.30E-21
log(WT)log(P) + log(P)log(Dp) + log(P)log(WT)log(Dp)
log (WD) ∼ log (P) + log (WT)+log(Dp)+log(WT)log(Dp) + 0.4272 0.8440 72.1959 88.3987 4.80E-19
P: Operating pressure [bar],WT: Wall thickness [in],Dp: Diameter [in],WD: Width-to-Depth ratio
The best regression is the one with a highestR2-adjusted and lowest RSE,AICc, BICc and
p-Value. These results initially suggest that the operating pressure could determine an adequate
regression model (i.e., log(WD) ∼ log(P)) because the RSE and theR2-adjusted were almost the
same as the other models. However, their information criteria give better results than the other
models. Nevertheless, AIC and BIC penalize the models that include more predictors, so further
information is required for this selection. Consequently, the regression model of log(WD) ∼
log(P) + log(Dp) + log(P) log(Dp) was evaluated because it obtained better results in RSE,2-
adjusted and AIC. This is due to the relaxation of the additive assumption, which is associated
with the interaction parameter between log(P) and log(Dp) (James et al., 2013). This relaxation
can be shown using Eq. 11 as follows:
log (WD) = β1 log (P) + β2 log (Dp) + β3 log (P) log (Dp) + ǫ
=
[
β1 + β3 log (Dp)
]
log(P) + β2 log (Dp) + ǫ
= β̂1 log(P) + β2 log (Dp) + ǫ
(19)
whereβ̂1 = β1 + β3 log(Dp). Sinceβ̂1 changes with log(Dp), the effect of log(P) is no longer
constant. Indeed, adjusting log(Dp) will change the impact of log(P) on log(WD) (James et al.,
2013).
Considering this regression, the main assumptions were evaluated based on their diagnostic
plot shown in Fig.7. A pattern that is slightly affected by some records (red line) is shown in Fig.
7a, but overall it has a flat tendency confirming the linearity assumption. The QQ-plot, which
is illustrated in Fig. 7b, indicates that the residuals of the regression are normally distributed
because the records lie almost on the diagonal of the QQ-plot. Regarding homoscedasticity and
the independence assumptions, note that in Fig. 7c the residuals are mostly equally spread.
This result suggests that the variance does not change drastically along the fitted values and
the data are independent. Finally, Fig. 7d depicts the evaluation of the leverage. Note in this
figure that some records obtain a high leverage that may affect the regression performance, so
it was assessed whether it was beneficial to remove these data points, considering the sample
size. For this purpose, an outlier and leverage diagnoses were implemented with the studentized
residuals and Residuals-Leverage plots. Recall that the observations whose studentized residuals
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Figure 7: Diagnostic plot log(WD) ∼ log(P) + log(Dp) + log(P) log(Dp).
obtained range from -2.77 to 2.43, so there is not strong evidence for the presence of outliers.
The leverage diagnosis obtained results near to 0.25, which indicate that the model could neglect
this leverage and maintain the records with a high leverage. In conclusion, the main assumptions
are satisfied and this regression mainly describes the dataset.




log(Dp) -0.1648 -0.5449 0.2152
log(P) 0.0026 -0.0034 0.0085
log(Dp) log(P) 0.1156 -0.1510 0.3822
Table 7 shows the coefficients obtained and their confidence intervals following Eq. 13 and
α = 5%. The prediction interval in Eq. 14 was determined usingX′o =
[
log(Dp), log(P), log(Dp) log(P)
]
and ỹo = log(WD), where the latter is obtained from the coefficients reported in Table 7 using
Eq. 19. Note that the predictor vectorX′o does not include the first entry associated with 1 be-
cause this regression omits the intercept. Considering the evaluated predictorsX′o, hi prediction






























The aforementioned results allow decision makers to predict the WD ratio of a crater with
a reference cover of 0.9144 m based on the operating pressure, the pipeline diameter, and the
product of both parameters.
4.3. Feasible crater dimensions
4.3.1. Copula-based approach
Considering the correlation coefficient of Set 4 (Table 5), the Kendall correlation coefficient
was 0.7890. This coefficient serves as the off-diagonal entries in the correlation matrix (R) of the














density and thepdf of the multivariate Gaussian, this copula density function is described as
follows (see Blumentritt (2011)):





























where |R| denotes the determinant ofR, U ∈ [0, 1]d and Id is the d-identity matrix. Then,
considering that the jointpdf of a random vector is obtained from the copula density function, and
that the marginal densities of each variable (see Eq. 16), the width-depth joint density distribution
is given by:











































whereFD andFW are the cumulative Gamma distributions of the width and depth;fD and fW are
thepdf of the width and depth; andΦ−1 is the inverse normal cumulative distribution, the latter
can be determined from the error function as:Φ−1(p) =
√
2erf−1(2p− 1), wherep ∈ (0, 1).
4.3.2. Feasible width and depth of craters - Case studies
To illustrate how the feasible width and depth of the crater can be calculated, let us consider
the following real accidents: Brunswick (GA, USA) in 2002 and Warren (MN, USA) in 2014.
The first occurred on November 30, 2002 in a pipeline distributing natural gas and it created a
3 m long, 3 m wide, 1.5 m deep crater. The second accident took place on May 26, 2014 in
a natural gas transmission pipeline and led to the evacuation of 10 families and a crater which
was 9.1 m long, 9.1 m wide and 4.6 m deep. The relevant information from these accidents is
summarized in Table 8. Note that because the burial depthbd is not reported in both cases, the
adjusted depthD∗ coincides with the reported depth. For more information about these accidents,
the reader may refer to the information reported in Ramı́rez-Camacho et al. (2017).
Table 8: Brunswick and Warren accidents summary.
Case Dp (in) P (bar) bd (m) Crater’s Width (m) Crater’s Depth (m) D∗ (m) WD
Brunswick 8 17.2 - 3.0 1.5 1.5 2.00
Warren 24 56.9 - 9.1 4.6 4.6 1.98
To calculate the fitted WD ratio and its prediction interval (for both accidents), implement
Eq. 19 and Eq. 20. Evaluate these equations at the pipeline diameterDp and the operating
pressureP from Table 8, and the regression coefficients reported in Table 7. The result of the
initial prediction was a WD ratio of 1.417 for Brunswick’s accident and 2.641 for Warren’s
accident. The prediction intervals obtained were [0.568-3.537] for the Brunswick accident and
[1.146-6.087] for the Warren accident. Note that in both cases, the real WDs were within these
prediction intervals.
Based on the prediction interval and the regression results, let us describe the process to





















































Figure 8: Depths’pdf with the regression results for the a) Brunswick accident and b) Warren accident
results (WDlwr , WDf it andWDuwr ratios) and theDp reported in Table 8. For these cases, take a
Wmaxof a 99.9% percentile for the fitted Gamma distribution (See Table 5) and a partition number
of np = 10, 000. The jointpdf that follows the WD relation as in Eq. 18 (i.e.,fW,D(WD · d, d))
is calculated from Eq. 22. The normalizedp f is then obtained from the quotient between
fW,D and its area derived using a trapezoidal numerical integration. This normalizedpdf for the
lower, mean and upper fitted WD results in both accidents are illustrated in Fig. 8. Finally, the
feasible dimensions are obtained using the maximum criterion for the Brunswick accident and
the expected value criterion for the Warren accident, where the latter was determined using a
trapezoidal rule integration. The crater dimensions obtained are presented in Table 9.
Table 9: Feasible dimensions of the craters.
Case
Lower Fit Mean Fit Upper Fit
W D W D W D
Brunswick 0.594 1.046 2.734 1.929 6.361 1.798
Warren 3.222 2.811 8.632 3.268 9.453 1.553
For the Brunswick accident, the Less Severe scenario correspond with the Lower Fit, the
Worst scenario uses the width reported in the Upper Fit, and the depth uses the one from the Mean
Fit. For the Warren accident, the Less Severe scenario considers the width from the Lower Fit
and the depth from the Upper Fit, whereas the Worst scenario considers the width from the Upper
Fit and the depth from the Mean Fit. In both cases, the Most Likely scenario coincides with the
Mean Fit. These scenarios are illustrated in Fig. 9, where it can be shown that the reported crater
dimensions are somewhere between the Most Likely and the Worst scenarios. Additionally, note
that both the Less Severe scenarios have reported dimensions that are significantly smaller than
the other scenarios and the dimensions reported; hence, the other scenarios could be considered
instead.
Considering the limited amount of available data, these scenarios give an adequate prediction
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Figure 9: Crater Scenarios for the a) Brunswick and b) Warren accidents
real crater dimensions, whereas for the Worst scenario of the Warren accident predicts the real
crater dimensions almost entirely. To illustrate the model prediction capabilities, the dimensions
reported from 9 additional accidents were compared with those obtained with the probabilistic
model in the Lower, Mean and Upper fits (Table 10). The results indicate that the real width and
depth dimensions lie almost entirely within these three fits.













Predicted WD Lower Fit Mean Fit Upper Fit
Lower Mean Upper W D∗ W D∗ W D∗
6 70.0 - 2.0 2.00 2.00 1.000 0.667 1.814 4.9380.792 1.188 3.836 2.115 6.295 1.275
16 27.6 - 2.4 3.00 3.00 0.800 0.767 1.850 4.461.011 1.319 3.931 2.126 6.417 1.439
16 55.2 - 4.6 1.53 1.53 3.000 0.989 2.314 5.4141.552 1.569 4.994 2.158 6.076 1.122
18 58.9 1.1 5.2 2.80 3.07 1.693 1.052 2.450 5.7052.829 2.689 8.152 3.328 9.672 1.695
20 46.9 0.6 6.1 2.03 2.86 2.136 1.009 2.337 5.4122.653 2.630 7.833 3.352 9.828 1.816
24 54.6 1.0 9.0 4.50 5.02 1.791 1.129 2.601 5.9953.150 2.790 8.538 3.282 9.506 1.586
24 54.8 1.8 10.0 2.20 1.92 5.198 1.131 2.605 6.0033.156 2.792 8.546 3.281 9.502 1.583
30 71.4 0.9 7.6 3.00 3.78 2.012 1.332 3.091 7.1744.016 3.015 9.466 3.062 8.788 1.225
30 69.4 1.8 9.1 1.80 1.68 5.428 1.320 3.057 7.0823.962 3.022 9.415 3.080 8.844 1.249
Dp: Pipeline diameter,P: Internal pressure,bd: Burial depth,D∗: Adjusted depth,W: Predicted width
However, for the sake of a deeper comparison, consider the Most Likely crater dimensions
that are associated with the mean fit, and their 25% and 75% percentiles from the quotient be-
tween fW,D and its area. Figure10 shows the realvs. Most Likely crater dimensions with these
percentiles. This figure demonstrates that crater dimensions can be predicted using this Mean
fit range with an error smaller than 2 m, here the greatest error was found in a 18-inch pipeline.
Considering that the Maximum Probability approach (forDp < 18in) produces shorter predic-
tions than the Expected probability approach (forDp ≥ 18in), these two approaches could be
implemented at the same time for this pipeline diameter with the aim of reducing the prediction
range. Nevertheless, the differences between the real dimensions and the Mean fit range sug-
gest adequate prediction performance of the model taking into account the limited amount of
available records and that properties of the soil were not considered.
Finally, the probabilistic model was compared with some of the models reviewed in Section
2 noting that these models depend on soil properties that usually are not included in incident
reports, or that are subject to significant uncertainty. However, considering some of the cases
discussed in Silva et al. (2016), our probabilistic predictions were comparable with the majority























































Figure 10: Real vs. predicted dimensions
able accuracy for the probabilistic model in almost all cases, with the exception of the accident
with a 20-inch, 15 m wide pipeline. This accident occurs in a location with a ”Salty Clay Loam”
soil according to Silva et al. (2016), which may affect the model predictions. The advantage of
the proposed model is that only design parameters must be implemented (i.e.,P, bd andDp). On
the contrary, the methods described in Section 2 need additional parameters that are subjected
to significant uncertainty (e.g., soil properties and crater angles) or are not well-documented
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The importance of the crater dimensions lies in their possibility to evaluate a domino effect
scenario in parallel pipelines as well as the possibility to support decision-making processes in
the construction and design of parallel corridors. The formation of a crater can expose adjacent
pipelines and trigger a domino eff ct due to the initial overpressure or by a thermal failure given
a Jet Fire in the source pipe. For the construction/design of parallel corridors, the crater dimen-
sions can be used to define pipelines Right-of-Way (ROW) or to propose safe distances between
parallel pipelines to avoid the events that can escalate to a domino effect, for instance, using
Jet Fire models as in Haklar (1997); Haklar & Dresnack (1999); Sklavounos & Rigas (2006);
Mohsin et al. (2014). Additionally, other applications such as the adjustment of the view factor
from a Jet Fire model, which considers the crater obstacle, can be also considered. This adjust-
ment would prevent an overestimation of the received heat radiation of an object on the ground
level.
For the evaluation of domino eff ct, let us consider two real accidents involving parallel
pipelines with natural gas. The first occurred in Rapid City (Canada) in 1995, where a 42-inch
gas main pipeline failed due to stress corrosion cracking. The crater formed by this rupture
uncovers an adjacent 36-inch gas main pipeline that failed because of the heat overload from a
fire on the source pipeline. The second accident took place in Buick (Canada) in 2012, where a
rupture and fire occurred in a 16-inch gas-gathering pipeline due to a hook crack. The rupture
exposed a parallel 6.625-inch gas-gathering pipeline, which after 25 minutes failed because of
flame impingement. The parameters from these pipelines are summarized in Table 11.
Table 11: Operating and structural parameters from domino effect accidents (TSB, 1997, 2013b)
Case
Source pipeline Target pipeline
Dp (in) bd (m) P (bar) Dp (in) bd (m) P (bar)
Rapid City 42 1.5 60.7 36 1.5 60.7
Buick 16 0.5 66.6 6.625 0.5 8.7
Dp: Pipeline diameter,bd: Burial depth andP:Operating pressure
The predicted worst scenario crater for the source pipeline in the Rapid City accident is
illustrated in Fig. 12. The width and depth for the source pipe’s crater are 10.04 m and 5.50
m, respectively. Note that if the crater were assumed to be symmetrical, the distance from the
crater to the target pipe would be around 1.9 m. Nevertheless, this distance could be shorter
because of the flame direction and the ”hydraulic mining hose” described by Peekema (2013).
Note also that if the crater were not assumed to be symmetrical, then it would be oriented to
the target pipe, so it is likely that the initial rupture would uncovers the 36-inch main pipeline.
Assuming that the target pipeline fails due to the fire, the predicted crater of this pipe would have
a width of 9.91 m and a depth of 5.30 m. As a result, the equivalent crater width and depth of
the accident are around 17 m and 5 m, respectively, which do not differ from the real dimensions
significantly. According to the report, the width was 23 m and the depth was around 5 m, which
is an interesting result taking into account the limited amount of available information. Other
approaches like the Advantica or the Accident-based models obtained width results of about
12.23 and 16.5 m, which are farther for, the reported wide1.
As in the Rapid City accident, Fig.13 shows the predicted crater with the worst scenario for
the source pipe in the accident near Buick. This figure indicates that a rupture in the source

























Figure 12: Predicted crater of the Rapid City accident
pipe certainly would uncover the 6.625-inch gathering line because the difference between the
crater and the target pipe is around 0.01 m. As in the previous accident, a fire is oriented to
the target pipe that can reduce this distance. Following a similar procedure as in the Rapid City
accident, the equivalent crater dimensions would be around 8.71 m wide and 3.42 m deep. These
dimensions are greater than the reported crater that is 7.6 m wide and 1.1 m of deep, but it is












Figure 13: Predicted crater of the Buick accident
Finally, there are potential applications for the use ROW definition. According to the guide-
lines for parallel construction of pipelines of INGAA (2008), federal agencies in the United
States such as the Federal Regulatory Commission, require the implementation of an existing
ROW for the construction of new interstate natural gas pipelines. Therefore, parallel pipelines
can be located in a same ditch with a minimum distance between them of 1 m. Note that these
ROW ditch lengths could depend on the pipeline diameter: i) 10 m for a pipeline with a diam-
eter less than 8 inches; ii) 13 m for a pipeline whose diameter is between 10 to 18 inches; and
iii) 15 m for a pipeline with a diameter between 20 to 36 inches (PEMEX, 2009). Now, if two
parallel pipelines whose diameters are in the last category (20-36 inches) are in the same ditch,
they would be separated by at least 1 m and as much 14 m. Suppose this separation is about
7-8 m (as in the Rapid City accident), then the examples and the predicted width dimensions














could be suggested like in Silva et al. (2016) by using only an extension of the crater width;
nevertheless, this scenario is likely to be followed by a jet fire (Bubbico et al., 2016), so further
calculations that are outside of the scope of this paper should be implemented. For more details
see Ramı́rez-Camacho et al. (2015); Alileche et al. (2015); Haklar (1997); Haklar & Dresnack
(1999); Sklavounos & Rigas (2006); Mohsin et al. (2014). Nonetheless, the probabilistic-based
approach proposed in this paper could be implemented to support ROW definition by evaluating
the exposure possibility of two parallel or crossing pipelines.
5. Conclusions
This paper presents a model to predict the feasible crater dimensions (i.e., width and depth)
produced by an underground natural gas (NG) pipeline given a LOC. This model was developed
based on a recent review of 90 real accidents of underground NG pipelines(Ramı́rez-Camacho
et al., 2017) in a probability-based approach with a maximum or expected criterion. The feasible
dimensions obtained with this model allow a decision maker to evaluate the possibility of expo-
sure of a parallel or cross pipeline, which in turn can be used to identify a domino effect scenario
and to evaluate Right-of-Way (ROW) corridors for parallel or crossing routes.
The probabilistic approach was developed based on a multivariate regression and a Gaussian
copula. The multivariate regression predicts the width-to-depth ratio (WD) of the crater based
on a trained set of 57 over 90 reported accidents after a gathering process, whereas the copula
approximates the width-depth jointpdf. Based on a prediction interval of the multivariate regres-
sion and the joint width-depth density, three scenarios were proposed: Less Severe, Most Likely
and Worst scenarios.
The model has been tested for the accidents in Brunswick (GA, USA) in 2012 and War-
ren (MN, USA) in 2014 and obtained results near to those reported. The greatest diff rence
was around 1.3 m for the Warren’s accident depth, which could be attributed to a non-reported
cover depth that is greater than the cover reference used. Results from 9 additional cases and
a comparison with other models that predict the crater width indicate that the model has ade-
quately prediction capabilities considering the limit amount of available records. In addition, the
Rapid City (Canada, 1995) and Buick (Canada, 2012) accidents were used to illustrate that these
pipelines were very likely to trigger a domino eff ct scenario because of the proximity between
their parallel pipelines, the crater dimensions obtained, and the jet flame direction relative to the
target pipes.
This paper seeks to support decision-making processes regarding NG pipelines due to crater
formation. However, the readers should bear in mind that this approach does not implement
information regarding soil properties, pipeline route, and crater angles because none of these
parameters are usually reported.
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α1, α2 Crater’s angle at the ground surface and at
D/2 for the Gasunie model
βi Regression coefficients
ǫ Regression residual error
γ Gas specific heat ratio
Id The d-identity matrix
U Uniformly distributed random vector
ν Soil parameter for the Gasunie model
Φ−1(·) Inverse normal cumulative distribution
Φ2(·, ·) Bivariate Gaussian distribution with meanO
and correlation matrixR
ρ, ρsoil Gas and soil densities
σY Yield strength
erf−1(·) Inverse error function
β̃ j Predicted regression coefficient
ỹo Prediction of the future regression response
a, b Ellipse shape parameters for the Gasunie
model
bd Burial depth
C(·, ·) Copula distribution function





Fi (·) Distribution of theith variable
fi (·) Density function of theith variable
fW,D Joint width-depth density function




tα/2,n−k−1 Student’s t inverse cumulative distribution at
α/2 with n− k− 1 degrees of freedom
ux Velocity of the explosive gases for the Batelle
model
ukr Critical gas velocity for the Batelle model
W Crater’s width
Wmax Maximum evaluated width
WD Width-to-depth ratio
WT Pipeline wall thickness
X Fitted observations for thek predictors
Xo Predictors to be evaluated
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Appendix A. Dataset
Table A.12 shows the processed records from each dataset in Fig. 5. This table includes the
corresponding ID from the review in Ramı́rez-Camacho et al. (2017) and the initial source.
Table A.12: Records obtained from each dataset
Set ID Date Place D(in) t(m) P(bar) D∗(m) W(m) WD REF
S1 4 04/03/1965 Natchitoches, LA,
USA
24 0.250 54.6 5.024 9.0 1.791(HSE, 2002; MHIDAS, 2007)
S1 7 02/03/1974 Monroe, LA, USA 30 0.438 56.0 7.326 9.1 1.242(HSE, 2002)
S1 8 15/03/1974 Farmington, NM,
USA
12 0.250 34.9 3.459 5.2 1.503(HSE, 2002)
S1 9 21/05/1974 Meridian, MS,
USA
6.6 0.071 21.1 1.982 3.0 1.514(MHIDAS, 2007)
S1 10 09/06/1974 Bealeton, VA,
USA
30 0.312 50.5 2.776 11.0 3.962(HSE, 2002)
S1 11 09/08/1976 Cartwright, LA,
USA
20 0.250 54.1 3.872 7.6 1.963(HSE, 2002)














Table A.12: continued from previous page
Set ID Date Place D(in) t(m) P(bar) D∗(m) W(m) WD REF
S1 15 25/03/1984 Erlangen-
Eltersdorf, Ger-
many
28 0.276 67.5 6.626 30.0 4.528(HSE, 2000)
S1 17 25/11/1984 Jackson, LA, USA 30 0.311 71.4 3.776 7.6 2.012(HSE, 2002)
S1 19 27/04/1985 Beaumont, KY,
USA
30 0.469 69.7 3.576 11.6 3.243(HSE, 2000)
S1 21 21/02/1986 Lancaster, KY,
USA
30 0.375 69.4 1.676 9.1 5.428(HSE, 2000)
S1 23 06/06/1990 Marionville, ON,
Canada
12.7 0.252 47.0 1.737 1.5 0.864(HSE, 2002)
S1 26 15/07/1992 Potter, ON, Canada 36 0.360 69.0 5.400 13.6 2.519(HSE, 2002; MHIDAS, 2007)
S1 27 22/12/1993 Palaceknowe,
Moffat, Scotland
36 0.752 48.0 2.829 10.0 3.535(MHIDAS, 2007; BAM, 2009)
S1 30 23/03/1994 Edison, NJ, USA 36 0.675 68.2 2.429 20.0 8.235(HSE, 2000)
S1 31 23/07/1994 Latchford, ON,
Canada
36 0.360 69.0 4.900 16.0 3.265(HSE, 2000)
S1 33 29/07/1995 Rapid City, MB,
Canada
42 0.371 60.7 2.981 23.0 7.715(TSB, 1997)
S1 34 15/04/1996 St. Norbert, MB,
Canada
34 0.500 50.0 5.478 13.5 2.464(HSE, 2000)
S1 36 19/08/2000 Carlsbad, NM,
USA
30 0.335 47.0 5.576 15.5 2.780(NTSB, 2003)
S1 44 23/03/2003 Eaton, CO, USA 24 0.250 56.0 3.824 15.0 3.923(BAM, 2009)
S1 45 01/05/2003 Pierce County,
WA, USA
26 0.281 43.6 4.275 6.1 1.427(MHIDAS, 2007)
S1 48 30/07/2004 Ghislenghien,
Belgium
40 0.512 80.0 4.830 14.0 2.898(BAM, 2009)
S1 54 25/08/2008 Pilot Grove, MO,
USA
24 0.281 55.2 1.924 10.0 5.198(DOT, 2008)
S1 57 04/05/2009 Palm City, FL,
USA
18 0.250 58.9 3.072 5.2 1.693(NTSB, 2013)
S1 66 20/07/2011 Gillette, WY, USA 30 0.438 92.4 3.476 7.5 2.157(PHMSA, 2012c)
S1 69 21/11/2011 Batesville, MS,
USA
24 0.250 51.6 2.424 23.8 9.818(PHMSA, 2013b)
S1 74 28/06/2012 Buick, BC, Canada 16 0.250 66.6 1.921 7.6 3.957(TSB, 2013b)
S1 77 08/10/2013 Harper County,
OK, USA
30 0.344 55.8 4.776 9.1 1.905(PHMSA, 2013a)
S1 85 27/06/2014 East Godavari, AP,
India
18 0.133 44.1 3.372 7.0 2.076(Mishra & Wehrstedt, 2015)
S1 89 17/04/2015 Fresno, CA, USA 12 0.254 88.3 2.319 5.6 2.415(Exponent, 2015)
S2 18 10/03/1985 Ignace, ON,
Canada
36 0.360 66.5 3.000 10.6 3.533(HSE, 2002; BAM, 2009)
S2 24 15/01/1991 Cochrane, ON,
Canada
30 0.360 63.1 7.000 33.0 4.714(HSE, 2002)
S2 25 08/12/1991 Cardinal, ON,
Canada
20 0.252 63.4 2.700 9.0 3.333(HSE, 2002)
S2 40 15/03/2002 Iron County, MI,
USA
36 0.375 51.7 9.100 9.1 1.000(DOT, 2002)
S2 43 02/02/2003 near Viola,
IL,USA
24 0.312 56.0 7.600 12.0 1.579(MHIDAS, 2007; BAM, 2009)
S2 55 14/09/2008 Appomattox, VA,
USA
30 0.344 55.1 4.600 11.3 2.457(PHMSA, 2008)
S2 68 16/11/2011 Glouster, OH,
USA
36 0.344 52.5 4.600 9.1 1.978(PHMSA, 2011b)
S2 70 03/12/2011 Marengo County,
AL, USA














Table A.12: continued from previous page
Set ID Date Place D(in) t(m) P(bar) D∗(m) W(m) WD REF
S2 75 11/12/2012 Sissonville, WV,
USA
20 0.281 64.1 4.300 10.9 2.535(NTSB, 2014)
S2 78 17/10/2013 Fort McMurray,
AB, Canada
36 0.465 92.0 5.000 15.0 3.000(TSB, 2013a)
S2 80 25/01/2014 Otterburne, MB,
Canada
30 0.370 63.3 3.000 12.5 4.167(TSB, 2014)
S3 5 22/02/1973 Austin, TX, USA 10.8 0.373 36.9 1.205 3.1 2.530(HSE, 2002)
S3 46 13/12/2003 Toledo, WA, USA 26 0.281 35.0 5.708 15.4 2.698(HInt Dossier, 2005)
S3 50 30/06/2005 Douglas County,
KS, USA
20 0.312 47.0 2.856 6.1 2.136(PHMSA, 2012b)
S3 60 12/09/2009 near Englehart,
ON, Canada
36 0.400 68.7 2.933 6.1 2.080(TSB, 2009)
S3 61 05/11/2009 Bushland, TX,
USA
24 0.250 53.0 4.324 12.9 2.983(PHMSA, 2009)
S3 62 09/09/2010 San Bruno, CA,
USA
30 0.375 25.9 3.410 7.9 2.317(NTSB, 2011)
S3 63 30/11/2010 Natchitoches
Parish, LA, USA
30 0.312 46.3 1.710 4.6 2.690(PHMSA, 2011d)
S3 64 08/12/2010 East Bernard, TX,
USA
24 0.500 49.6 3.057 7.6 2.486(PHMSA, 2011c)
S3 65 19/02/2011 Beardmore, ON,
Canada
36 0.360 66.2 5.233 13.0 2.484(TSB, 2011)
S3 79 29/11/2013 Houstonia, MO,
USA
30 0.312 61.6 3.843 9.5 2.472(PHMSA, 2014)
S4 20 20/08/1985 Lowther, ON,
Canada
36 0.360 67.9 4.900 14.7 3.000(HSE, 2002)
S4 22 02/03/1986 Callander, ON,
Canada
36 0.360 62.6 4.000 12.0 3.000(HSE, 2002)
S4 58 05/05/2009 Rockville, IN,
USA
24 0.312 54.6 2.833 8.5 3.000(DOT, 2009)
S4 73 06/06/2012 Laketon, TX, USA 26 0.250 47.4 1.667 5.0 3.000(PHMSA, 2012a)
S4 87 14/01/2015 Brandon, MS,
USA
30 0.375 52.9 2.667 8.0 3.000(PHMSA, 2015b)
S4 90 03/08/2015 Falfurrias, TX,
USA
16 0.250 57.0 3.033 9.1 3.000(PHMSA, 2015a)
30
